Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia:

I. V. Petrov, Professor, Doctor of Economic Sciences

Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia:
A. A. Vasin, Professor, Doctor of Physico-Mathematical Sciences
S. A. Vartanov, Associate Professor, Candidate of Physico-Mathematical Sciences, sergvart@gmail.com

The article presents approaches to modeling efficient control over adherence to safety standards in coal mines using the Optimization Theory and Game Theory methods. The models take into account potential risks generated by the participants of the production and inspection processes. The modeling has produced the method of optimized inspection structuring depending on the mine performance. In different technical and economic situations, considering risk of conspiracy, the single-level and twolevel systems of control are optimal. The first level control is performed continuously, by inspectors and equipment operated by them. The second level control is implemented at an assigned probability, by special inspectorate, with possible use of specialized equipment. The models proposed in this study also allow time dynamics modification and consideration of supplementary managerial decisions (turnover of crews, staffing re-structuring) and personnel behavioral patterns (various level mobility). Based on the implemented research findings, some practical recommendations can be formulated for the operational safety control and accident prevention. In particular, it is recommended to supervise adherence to safety standards by the two-level inspection. The first level is personnel responsible for the continuous supervision of miners and operating safety in the extraction areas. Thus, the off-site inspection includes visiting and supervision of extraction areas and creation of the surveillance system only controllable by the higher level management or totally automated. The auditing should be unscheduled and at a rate to fit probabilities calculated in accordance with the presented approach.

1. Mining Safety. World Coal Association, 2019. Available at: https://www.worldcoal.org/coal/coalmining/mining-safety (accessed: 19.12.2019).
2. Vartanov A. Z., Petrov I. V., Fedash A. V. Risk-oriented provision of mining operations safety at the enterprises of mineral resources sector in Russia. IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science. 2018. Vol. 206. 012014. DOI: 10.1088/1755–1315/206/1/012014
3. Baskakov V. P., Galkin P. A., Poleshchuk M. N. Mathematical modeling of instability impact on efficiency of production. GIAB. 2007. Special issue 17. Safety of coal mining. pp. 264–270.
4. Mine safety regulatory reform. NSW. Available at: https://www.resourcesregulator.nsw.gov.au/safety-and-health (accessed: 19.12.2019).
5. Myaskov A. V., Popov S. M., Kazakov V. B., Bosova E. V. Problems and Prospects of Assurance of HR Demands in Coal Industry Facilities. Ugol. 2014. No. 10. pp. 86–91.
6. Myaskov A. V. The future of mining engineers: interdisciplinary and digitization work. Gornyi Zhurnal. 2018. No. 2. pp. 13–17.
7. Markulik Š., Cehlár M., Kozel R. Process approach in the mining conditions. Acta Montanistica Slovaca. 2018. Vol. 23, No. 1. pp. 46–52.
8. Shuck B., Roberts T. P., Zigarmi D. Employee Perceptions of the Work Environment, Motivational Outlooks, and Employee Work Intentions: An HR Practitioner’s Dream or Nightmare? Advances in Developing Human Resources. 2018. Vol. 20, Iss. 2. pp. 197–213.
9. Tohidi H. The role of risk management in IT systems of organizations. Procedia Computer Science. 2011. Vol. 3. pp. 881–887.
10. Myerson R. B. Mechanism design by an Informed Principal. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society. 1983. Vol. 51(6). pp. 1767–1797.
11. Hurwicz L. The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation. The American Economic Review. 1973. Vol. 63, No. 2. pp. 1–30.
12. Maskin E. S. Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals. The American Economic Review. 2008. Vol. 98, No. 3. pp. 567–576.
13. Nash J. F. Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 1950. Vol. 36, Iss. 1. pp. 48–49.
14. Nash J. Non-Cooperative Games. Annals of Mathematics. 1951. Vol. 54, No. 2. pp. 286–295.
15. Vasin A. A., Kozyreva E. A., Tyuleneva A. S. Optimization of the occupational safety compliance control (OSCC) system at a coal mining enterprise. Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International. 2017. Vol. 56, No. 5. pp. 810–817.
16. Grinberg R. S., Akhunov R. R., Volodin A. I., Gubarev R. V., Dzyuba E. I. Performance-Based Pay – a New (Mixed) Payment Scheme for Russian Civil Servants. Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast. 2018. Vol. 11, No. 6. pp. 163–183.
17. Urazov A. S. Optimum parameters of hierarchical control structures. Moscow University Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics. 2013. Vol. 37, No. 1. pp. 14–20.
18. Haritonova T. V., Shvandar D. V. Research approaches to the management of costs and financial results at the enterprises of the coal industry in the context of the transformation of the global coal market. Ugol. 2019. No. 4. pp. 30–35.
19. Available at: http://docs.cntd.ru/document/901807664 (accessed: 15.01.2020).